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A pressing issue in biology and social sciences is to explain how cooperation emerges in a population 
of self-interested individuals. Theoretical models suggest that one such explanation may involve 
the possibility of changing one’s neighborhood by removing and creating connections to others, but 
this hypothesis has problems when random motion is considered and lacks experimental support. 
To address this, we have carried out experiments on diluted grids with human subjects playing a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, 
we have found no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of 
cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries 
stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to 
establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting.
Cooperation is a desirable behavior that is fundamental for the harmonious development of society. 
However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about 
short-term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as 
kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as 
punishment. Reputation in the case of repeated interactions1 and assortment mechanisms that favor 
cooperator-cooperator interactions2 are the key, as first shown by W.D. Hamilton3 in the case of genetic 
relatedness. In principle, positive assortment among cooperators might also result when agents interact 
through network relationships. The reviews4,5 aptly summarize the vast amount of work that has been 
accomplished in the last two decades on the study of such cooperation-enhancement mechanism. Theory 
and numerical simulations suggest that network reciprocity can explain the evolution of cooperation in a 
population of self-regarding agents under certain circumstances (see, e.g.,6–9). But what can be said about 
real people? Recent research tested these predictions by means of targeted experiments with humans in 
the laboratory, in which the subjects were connected in specific network structures, including large-scale 
ones10–13. Surprisingly, these studies found that neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous network struc-
tures promote cooperation to a significant extent10,11,13–16.
However, when people are allowed to change their neighborhood by deleting unsatisfying relation-
ships and trying to form better ones, theoretical and numerical models agree in concluding that cooper-
ation may evolve (see, e.g.,17–20 among others). Remarkably, and in contrast to the static case, empirical 
laboratory tests of dynamic settings performed in the last few years did confirm experimentally that fluid 
networks allow cooperation to evolve21,22. In other words, unless there is uncertainty about the behavior 
of neighbors that is costly to resolve23, dismissing relationships towards exploiting defectors as a form of 
direct punishment usually allows cooperation to prevail, even when rewiring an undesired link requires 
paying a cost24. This is certainly an encouraging result and the laboratory settings used, except for their 
reduced size, do match to a significant extent in spirit present-day internet-mediated relational social 
networks in which links are essentially independent of location in physical space.
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Nevertheless, there also exist many situations in which geographical space does play a fundamental 
role in biological and ecological systems, as well as human societies. When agents find themselves in 
geographical space they usually can move around. Many examples can be found in mobility patterns of 
human populations, e.g.25, in engineered systems such as ad hoc networks of mobile communicating 
devices (see e.g.26,27), and mobile robot teams28,29 among others. In the case of agents interacting in phys-
ical space through game-theoretical principles, mobility might turn out to have an important effect for 
cooperation but, surprisingly, there has been comparatively little research in evolutionary game theory 
on this subject. Early on fixed regular lattices were used to represent spatial interactions in populations 
in a simplified manner in evolutionary games by Axelrod30 and by Nowak and May31. They showed 
that, even when the game is one-shot, i.e. pairs of players interact anonymously, cooperation can evolve 
thanks to positive assortment among cooperators. A summary of this and other early work on grids 
is provided in32. However, more recent extensive numerical simulation work showed that the gains in 
the paradigmatic Prisoner’s Dilemma game depend on the players’ strategy update rule used7. Mobility 
of individuals can readily be introduced in these models through the use of a diluted grid, i.e. a lattice 
only partially filled by players such that agents can change location by moving to an empty cell in the 
grid. Mobility may have positive or negative effects on cooperation, depending on several factors. An 
early study was carried out by Enquist and Leimar33 whose conclusion was that mobility may seriously 
restrict the evolution of cooperation as a result of randomization and invasion by defectors. In the last 
decade there have been several new studies of the influence of mobility on the behavior of various 
games in spatial environments, either in the case in which agents essentially perform random walks, 
or when they move according to heuristic strategy-driven considerations. Random diffusion of agents 
playing games has been studied in two-dimensional diluted grids34,35, as well as in continuous space36,37. 
Random diffusion has been thought to hinder cooperation by randomizing the population and reducing 
the possibility of cooperator cluster formation. However, the works34–36 show that cooperation can be 
maintained with respect to the static case and sometimes even enhanced for low mobility, depending on 
the strategy update rule used by the agents. When agents are allowed to move according to some simple 
heuristic rule instead of randomly, it has been shown that the population may evolve a certain degree of 
self-organization38–44. Clearly, intermediate situations also exist whereby the movement is partly random 
and partly contingent on some criterion.
A general conclusion about all the above works is that it is far from clear whether cooperation may 
be helped or hindered by random mobility as the result depends on many factors. Only purposeful 
contingent movements seem to be able to lead to highly cooperating population states38–44. In view of 
the practical importance of individuals’ mobility in geographical space it appears that, like the case of 
static and dynamic networks, some light could be shed on the issue by experimental work with human 
subjects. Indeed, to our knowledge, no laboratory experiment of this kind has been published to date. In 
the rest of the paper we discuss our experimental setting with its limitations and constraints, the results 
we obtain, and some possible interpretations of the observed player’s behavior.
Experimental Design
Our experimental setup is based on the customary Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game30,45. In this two-person 
game players must decide whether to cooperate or to defect. If both cooperate, each gets a payoff R. 
If one defects and the other cooperates, the defector gets T and the cooperator receives the payoff 
S. If both defect, each gets P. Since T > R > P > S, defection is a dominating strategy and a rational 
payoff-maximizing player will choose to defect, although mutual cooperation yields a higher collective 
payoff, whence the dilemma. Evolutionary reasoning leads to the same result, as defectors will reproduce 
at a higher rate due to their superior payoff46. This simple game is a good metaphor for the tension that 
exists between socially desirable outcomes and self-interested individual actions. In our experiment, 
subjects played a series of two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma games with their immediate neighbors in the 
network. We took T = 8, R = 6, P = 2, and S = 0.
Our experimental setting is new in that we introduce a virtual spatial dimension represented by a 
square grid that wraps around itself into a torus, as in the experiments reported in11,13, but we also allow 
for player movements, as explained below, like in the coordination experiment reported in47.
After having given the necessary information to the subjects (see SI sect. 1 for details), the experiment 
unfolds as follows. At the beginning, each of the twenty participants occupies a randomly assigned cell 
in an 8 × 8 grid giving a partially filled grid with a density of players ρ = 20/64 = 0.3125, i.e. about /1 3. 
Participants must then choose a cooperate or defect strategy. These are called simply A and B in the 
experiment so as not to create a psychological bias (the A and B meaning is switched for different 
groups).
Before deciding on the next actions to perform, subjects see the following information on their screen: 
their current strategy, their cumulated gain in conventional points (which is translated into actual mon-
etary payment at the end of the experiment), and the position and strategy of their current neighbors in 
the 8-cell neighborhood as schematically shown in Fig. 1a. As in most previous works, each player uses 
the same strategy against all her neighbors. Using different strategies against different neighbors (see 
e.g.48) might be more adequate if the neighbors were distinguishable, but not in our setting because 
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players do not have labels to tell them apart and, owing to mobility, they can leave their positions and 
be replaced by other anonymous players.
For each player, a round of the treatment consists first in deciding whether to keep the current strat-
egy or to switch to the other one. Next, each player decides whether or not to move to a neighboring 
empty cell, if any. To avoid multiple cell occupancy, if more than one player wants to move to the same 
cell only one is chosen at random. An illustration of a possible move decision by the central C player is 
given in Fig. 1b. For human players we assume that the decision of the cell to move to might be made 
according to some heuristic rather than fully randomly. Finding those heuristics and comparing them 
with theoretical models would be one relevant contribution of our experimental approach. Furthermore, 
the decision will be done under some uncertainty represented by the “?” symbols in the figure, which 
stand for a possible new neighbor with an unknown strategy or an empty cell. At the end of this process, 
participants accumulate their payoffs obtained by playing the PD in pairs against all their non-empty 
neighbors. These decisions are taken synchronously by all participants. After all players have completed 
these steps, another round begins.
Our spatial simulated setting is a necessary but, in our opinion, acceptable compromise between the 
obvious technical limitations of the laboratory and the much more general numerical simulation models 
that have been proposed in the literature34,35,38–41,43,44. Participants in the laboratory setting can only per-
form jumps to neighboring empty cells like in34,35,42. Given the number of available cells (64), long jumps 
like those of41,44 are out of the question, given the available laboratory equipment, for both technical and 
financial reasons because too many participants would be required.
In the following sections we first present our experimental results and then we discuss the global 
statistical behavior of the participants. Starting from these results we then try to uncover the rules of the 
participants’ decision making.
Results
We now turn to the discussion of the main experimental results. The first and most important observa-
tion is the global amount of cooperative acts in the population averaged over all treatments. This is 
shown in Fig. 2a where it is seen that cooperation could never increase past the initial fraction of about 
0.4 and stabilized itself around 0.2 Although it is well-known that, contrary to theoretical predictions, 
cooperation almost never goes to zero in experimental work on the PD, it appears that migration does 
not help cooperation to evolve, at least in the present experimental setting. Indeed, after a transient 
period of a few rounds, typical cooperation levels are similar to those found by Traulsen et al.13 in their 
experiment on a fixed full grid in spite of the widely different settings. Related experiments have been 
performed by Gruji ′c  et al.11 and Gracia-Lázaro et al.10 in which much larger full grids were used and, 
as in13, participants can be reassigned randomly to a different position but no autonomous mobility in 
the sense of our setting is provided. Here again the fraction of cooperation tends to stabilize around .0 2 
after a transient period.
Another view of the global cooperation results is given in Fig.  2b where we report the fraction of 
participants as a function of the percentage of cooperative actions cumulated over all participants and 
all sessions. For instance, the highest bar to the left represents the fraction of participants that cooperated 
between %0  and %10  of the times. Although it is clear that defection prevailed among the participants, 
it is interesting to note the presence of a region comprised between about %10  and %50  where people 
cooperated a fair amount of times. Another remarkable thing is that there exists a small fraction of 
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Figure 1. (a) An illustration of the neighborhood seen by participants (they don’t see the arrows). In this 
case, the central player could choose to switch to defection, and/or to migrate to one of the empty cells 
indicated by the arrows. (b) When it comes to decide whether to move or not, if the central player moves to 
the cell indicated by the arrow, it will keep the other cooperator as a neighbor while the other positions may 
contain either players with an unknown strategy, or are empty.
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players that cooperate more than %50  and even some participants that cooperate nearly always, as shown 
by the last bar to the right.
We have looked in more detail at the behavior of the group cooperating between 10% and 50% of 
the time in order to compare it with the findings of earlier experiments on the PD10,11,14–16. As Fig.  3 
shows, individuals in this group show a behavior consistent with the moody conditional cooperation 
found in those previous experiments: a cooperative decision is followed by another one with relatively 
high probability, the higher the number of cooperative partners in the previous round. On the contrary, 
a defection is most likely to be followed by another one. While we here show the dependence in terms of 
the difference between cooperators and defectors in the neighborhood, plotting the same two quantities 
as a function of the number of cooperative neighbors yields qualitatively the same results (see SI, Fig. S3). 
 Therefore, we conclude that, even if subjects can move around in our spatial setting, the decision to 
cooperate or to defect is very much determined by a reaction to the observed behavior in the neighbor-
hood and the players’ own mood, as in the PD experiments on fixed lattices.
The evolutionary process is a complex one but we hope to offer a gist of it with the time evolution 
shown in Fig. 4. This figure represents a particular instance in our experiment but it is absolutely typical 
of all treatments. The time frames in the figure represent rounds 25 to 39 of the first treatment. As can 
be seen from the sequence of snapshots, sometimes a few subjects that happen to be close to each other 
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
Round
Av
e
ra
ge
 fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 c
oo
pe
ra
to
rs
0−9 10−19 20−29 30−39 40−49 50−59 60−69 70−79 80−89 90−100
Percentage of cooperation
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
)b()a(
Figure 2. (a) Average fraction of cooperators as a function of time for all treatments. (b) Overall 
participants’ frequency of cooperation in deciles cumulated for all treatments. Most participants belong to 
the 0-10 decile and thus cooperate very little. In the low-middle range (10-50) we find participants who 
behave as “moody conditional cooperators” (see text).
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Figure 3. Probability of cooperating in the current round having cooperated (blue curve) or defected (red 
curve) in the previous one, as a function of the difference between the number of cooperators and defectors 
in the neighborhood in the previous round. The data are those of the participants cooperating between %10  
and %50  of the time (see Fig. 2b).
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cooperate simultaneously and initiate a cluster of cooperators. However, contrary to the pioneering sug-
gestion in31, these clusters do not spread: they are not stable and, after a few rounds they vanish as 
cooperators become tired of being exploited by defectors at the boundary. This phenomenon, which we 
insist we have observed in most sessions (see SI, sect. 3 for more snapshots), shows the stability of the 
asymptotic state of the population or, in other words, that once a defective behavior pattern sets in, it is 
practically impossible to revert it to a cooperative one.
Having discussed the emergence and decay of cooperation in general, taking into account previous 
experiments and intuitions, we now turn to the unique feature of our setting: the possibility of changing 
position that is offered to the participants and its possible effects on cooperation. In all our sessions, we 
have observed that players are rather mobile during the first rounds but, as time goes by, mobility 
decreases slightly and they tend to settle at some position in space, although movement never ceases until 
the end of the experiment (see SI, Fig. S4). In fact, a cooperator, unless she finds herself in a very favora-
ble cooperation environment, tends to escape from incoming defectors. Conversely, a defector moves 
because she is always seeking a cooperation environment in order to accumulate more payoff. We also 
note that mobility and the incentive to aggregate in order to get a larger payoff cause the mean degree 
to increase from the initial value of 2.41 to about 4 (see SI, Fig. S5).
Besides the global figures, it is perhaps of more interest to plot the average mobility behavior of 
cooperators, respectively defectors, as a function of the composition of the local neighborhood they 
experience, since this is the only information on which they can base their decisions (let us recall here 
that we do not show information on the earnings of their partners; in this respect, it is important to 
keep in mind that it has been recently shown that players do not take their partner’s payoff into account 
when making their choices15). Figure 5 shows the corresponding plots for the number of cooperators (a) 
and defectors (b) in the neighborhood, and the total number of neighbors (c), in the previous round.
In Fig. 5a, we observe that the mobility of both cooperators and defectors is lower on average than 
in Fig. 5b and decreases faster with the number of cooperating neighbors. This is in agreement with our 
interpretation that both cooperators and defectors aim at a cooperator environment as far as possible. 
Cooperators move more than defectors because the latter are more satisfied with a given number of 
cooperator neighbors. Figure 5b is somewhat more difficult to understand, but it shows that the mobility 
Figure 4. Snapshots for one of the treatments going from round 25 (upper left) to round 39 (lower right; 
time advances from left to right and from top to bottom). One can see the beginning of the formation and 
the subsequent dissolution of a cooperator cluster. Cooperators are in blue and defectors are painted red. A 
light blue cell stands for a cooperator that was a defector in the previous round and an orange cell indicates 
a defector that was a cooperator in the previous round.
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behavior of both cooperators and defectors is similar when the number of defecting neighbors is between 
two and four; however, the mobility of cooperators increases when this number is more than four. In 
this case cooperators feel exploited and try to evade defectors although the average number of free cells 
around them tends to decrease. In the other limit, i.e., when there are only a few defectors around, coop-
erators are more patient in tolerating exploitation while defectors move more frequently, searching for 
cooperators to exploit. This happens because with a mean degree tending to about four, there are about 
one or two other cooperators around the focal one and so the latter is relatively satisfied and shows less 
tendency to move. A caveat is in order here regarding mobility when many neighboring sites are occu-
pied, irrespective of the actions of the individuals occupying them: in those situations, players have less 
options to move (in fact, if they were completely surrounded, which is an uncommon phenomenon, they 
would not be able to move at all). This is reported in Fig. 5c where mobility of players of the two kinds 
becomes more and more hindered as the number of neighbors grows and, correspondingly, the number 
of free sites becomes small. This is an extra factor influencing their behavior and can also be responsible 
for part of the decay of the mobility in panels (a) and (b).
A complementary view of local mobility is provided by Fig. 6, in which the average mobility of both 
cooperators and defectors is reported as a function of the difference between the number of cooperators 
and defectors in the neighborhood of the focal player. It appears that mobility is maximal when this 
difference is around 0, meaning one cooperator less than the number of defecting neighbors. This is 
understandable because in this situation neither a cooperator nor a defector is satisfied. For instance, if 
a cooperator has a defector and another cooperator in his neighborhood, he will tend to move closer 
to the cooperator. However, as discussed above, when there are many cooperators and defectors in the 
neighborhood, most of the time the movement cannot take place, either because of collisions or because 
of lack of free cells. At the extremes of the curve, where the difference is large in absolute value, either 
the neighborhood is too crowded to allow movements, or the cases are rare and have a high standard 
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Figure 5. Average mobility of players in their neighborhood. Frequency of movement of cooperators and 
defectors as a function of (a) the number of cooperators in the previous round, (b) the number of defectors 
in the previous round, and (c) the total number of neighbors in the previous round.
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Figure 6. Frequency of movement of cooperators and defectors as a function of the difference between the 
number of cooperators and defectors in their neighborhood in the previous round.
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deviation, or they have not been observed. An interesting observation arising from Fig. 6 is that coop-
erators and defectors exhibit the same mobility, within the error bars, in the whole range of differences, 
which means that even if they are likely to move for different motives, their behavior could be described 
by the same, simple heuristics, opening the door to simulating larger systems and studying other param-
eter values.
Discussion
In this paper, we have presented the results of an experiment intended to shed light on the hitherto 
unclarified issue of the relevance of mobility in a geographical context to cooperation. In particular, 
important differences between random and purposeful motion in their ability to support cooperative 
interactions had been reported from a theoretical viewpoint, but experimental counterparts to those 
results were lacking. In the context of this previous literature, our most relevant result is that mobility 
does not promote cooperation: in fact, as in most experiments involving a Prisoner’s Dilemma, we have 
found that the fraction of cooperators decays from an initial value close to half the population to residual 
ones of approximately a 20%, a value that is almost universally found in the laboratory. In fact, a vast 
majority of players can be classified as defectors or as moody conditionally cooperators, i.e., as players 
whose probability of cooperation depend not only on the actions of their partners but on their own pre-
vious actions, a type first identified in10,11,15. This indicates that the possibility to move around in space 
does not change very much the way players choose their actions.
Remarkably, our experiments also contribute to the understanding of the possible assortment of coop-
erators in order to support cooperation. The numerical simulations reported in31 suggested that coop-
erators may survive by forming clusters in which they mainly interact with other cooperators. In our 
experiments, we have indeed observed that such clusters appear with non-negligible frequency; however, 
their lifetime is quite limited because the possibility to move allows cooperating agents at the bound-
ary of the cluster to separate from it to severe their interactions with defectors, or to choose defection 
themselves. A dynamical network view can also be taken considering that, at each discrete time step, 
one could draw a spatial graph in which edges connect players that are neighbors. At the next time step, 
owing to mobility, some links might disappear while new ones may be formed. This, except for the top-
ological constraints imposed by two-dimensional space, compares with dynamical relational networks. 
In contrast to what has been observed on the latter21,22, where allowing players to cut and make links at 
will does lead to clustering of cooperators and to an increase of the cooperation level, in our experiments 
we measure a much lower amount of cooperation. The reason can be traced back to the fact that, if links 
evolve indirectly by motion of the players in geographical space, they cannot be cut one by one, and when 
moving away from defectors cooperators also cut their links to cooperators. Therefore, we conclude that 
for clusters to be an important factor in the promotion of cooperation, individuals must have complete 
control on their choices of partners, a condition that has never been put forward before.
Regarding mobility, we have found that players move considerably at the beginning of the experiment, 
but the average fraction of individuals deciding to move decreases and by the end of the experiment 
only some 10%-20% of players are moving. We believe that this behavior is connected to the observa-
tion in the previous paragraph: players realize that the decision to move has very frequently pros and 
cons as it affects their connections in an indiscriminate manner, and at some point they conclude that 
they are not going to find a safe haven against defectors. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that 
in our experiment there is no punishment for interacting with a defector, and therefore all the residual 
motions observed in late stages must arise from spite, i.e., from subjects preventing others to benefit from 
them even if they are not harmed by those partners’ actions. This is in agreement with our finding that 
cooperators tend to move somewhat more often that defectors, implying that while the latter just move 
trying to find others to exploit, cooperators have the additional motivation to punish defecting partners. 
In addition, we have also observed that mobility of all players is maximum when there is more or less the 
same number of cooperators or defectors in the neighborhood. Of course, to interpret these results one 
needs to bear in mind that when a player has many partners her mobility is also reduced by the lack of 
available cells to move to. With this caveat, it appears that when the number of cooperators and defectors 
is approximately the same around a given subject, she will try to move to increase her interaction with 
cooperators irrespective of her own action, as can be expected. On the contrary, when there are many 
neighbors of the same type, mobility becomes less relevant and perhaps impossible, this being the reason 
why we observe a maximum.
In conclusion, we stress that the interaction between behaviour and mobility does not seem to increase 
the level of cooperation in a human population set on a geographical framework. The main reason for 
this phenomenon turns out to be the fact that setting and breaking links cannot be done independently 
for every player as the mechanism for rewiring is motion in space. Interestingly, these results pose impor-
tant questions about the emergence of cooperation in neighboring human groups, which could be most 
relevant in interactions in a socio-ecological context among hunter-gatherer groups, either in our recent 
evolutionary past or in presently existing populations. Furthermore, the type of mechanism we have 
unveiled with our experiment is most certainly not a very sophisticated way to make decisions, and 
therefore similar conclusions might apply to spatially structured populations of many other animals or 
bacteria. In this respect, our findings may provide a new perspective to interpret observational data on 
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cooperative behavior in social animals, pointing to other behavioral traits (e.g., in terms of deciding 
to move or to change action) that coevolve with the geographical distribution of the population in its 
ecological environment.
Methods
The use of human subjects in this experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University 
of Lausanne and it is in accordance with all relevant guidelines and regulations. We conducted a total of 
four experimental sessions in February-March 2014 in a specially equipped laboratory using the z-Tree 
environment49. The participants were fully informed of the nature of the experiment and signed an 
informed consent to participate. Their anonymity was guaranteed at all stages of the experiment. Each 
session involved 20 participants and a total of 80 subjects took part in the experiment. Each session 
consisted of two repetitions of the same treatment played by the same group but with new random initial 
conditions. An experimental treatment consists of 50 rounds but, to avoid end-of-treatment effects, this 
number is unknown to participants who are told that there will be between 30 and 60 rounds. Participants 
were recruited using ORSEE50 from a subject pool that includes students from several faculties of the 
University of Lausanne and of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL).
Students read a detailed description of the experiment before playing the game. After reading the 
instructions, subjects had to respond to a set of control questions that insured common understanding 
of the game and the computation of payoffs. An English translation of the instructions distributed to 
subjects is provided (see SI sect. 1). Each session lasted about 60 minutes. Participants earned a certain 
number of points during the experiment and their final score in points was converted at an exchange rate 
of 1.- CHF = 50 points. The average gain per student was 22.5 CHF (about 19 EUR).
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